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In real-world social interactions, social status influences responses to resource
distribution. However, the way in which one’s own social status interacts with
another’s status to influence responses to resource distribution is far from clear. In the
current study, we dynamically manipulated participants’ social status and then asked
participants to act as recipients in the ultimatum game (UG) along with proposers whose
social status was made known to the participants. Experiment 1 used a between-
participants design in which the participants were assigned as being of either high or low
status according to their performance in a math competition (i.e., rank-inducing task).
In Experiment 2, social status was manipulated within-subjects using the same rank-
inducing task, with rounds of UG interleaved between rank-inducing sessions. Findings
from the two experiments showed that both self-status and other-status influenced
responses to UG offers, as participants were more likely to accept low offers from
high status than low status proposers; this effect was particularly robust for low status
participants when compared with high status participants. These findings suggest that,
in comparison with individuals in high status, individuals in low status are more willing
to accept low offers during resource distribution and are more affected by other-status
considerations.
Keywords: social status, ultimatum game, social hierarchy, fairness, acceptance
INTRODUCTION
Social hierarchies exists in almost all social species, ranging from ants and fish (Bshary et al., 2014)
to humans. In more basic social hierarchies, each member’s place in the hierarchy is based along a
power dimension that often involves the use of dominance (Magee and Galinsky, 2008); in more
complex social hierarchies, such as those found in humans, each member’s place in the hierarchy
is determined in a multi-faceted fashion, as it is not only based on power, but also on social
status, which refers to prestige, competence, or respect in a relevant dimension or field (Henrich
and Gil-White, 2001). Much of the work on status-related hierarchy centers on social class (also
referred to as socioeconomic status, Adler et al., 2000; Kraus et al., 2009), which refers to one’s
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economic, professional, or educational standing. However, given
the common mixture of power and social class, it is difficult to
clearly delineate the effect of status from power, which results in
an impoverished understanding of the effects of social status by
itself.
Given the complexity of social hierarchies and the abundance
of potential confounding factors such as feelings of power when
using social class measures such as annual salary or education
level, researchers analyzing the effect of social status often turn to
controlled laboratory settings to prime social status (Zink et al.,
2008). In these types of procedures, researchers manipulate the
social status of participants by having them complete a rank-
inducing task (e.g., trivia quiz, Ball et al., 2001; Albrecht et al.,
2013), after which they give the participants a relative rank on
the measured dimension in comparison with other participants,
which is often indicated using stars (Ball et al., 2001; Zink
et al., 2008; Hu et al., 2014, 2016). The use of stars is effective
in indicating social status given their pervasive use in online
shopping websites, videogames, and the military. This type of
status, in which the participant is judged as “more” or “less”
competent than other players, is a well-accepted tool for priming
feelings of social status (Zink et al., 2008). Importantly, previous
work shows that the effect of rank-induced status on responses to
resource distribution is similar to the effect of status differences
between men and women (Eckel and Grossman, 2001) and
between high and low status African peasants (D’Exelle et al.,
2009) on responses to resource distribution.
Past research on social status demonstrates the importance
of social status during resource distribution, with low status
individuals demanding less in bargaining situations than
high status individuals (Ball et al., 2001; Albrecht et al.,
2013; Hu et al., 2014, 2016). However, these studies have
shortcomings that prevent a comprehensive understanding
regarding the interaction between one’s own status and others’
status and its effect on economic decision-making. Albrecht
et al. (2013) measured satisfaction ratings of disadvantageous,
equitable, and advantageous payoffs between the participant and
another hypothetical participant of inferior, similar, or superior
status and found that individuals in inferior status perceived
disadvantageous inequality payoffs as more satisfactory than
superior status individuals. However, it is unclear to what extent
the feelings of satisfaction can directly map onto actual economic
decisions. Moreover, this study focused on the relationship
between middle status participants and superior/inferior ranked
partners, which does not allow for an investigation into the
potential behavioral differences in participants of the lowest
or highest status. Ball et al. (2001) did measure the effect of
having high or low status in bargaining situations and found
that low status participants demanded less than those in high
status. However, this study separated low and high status by role
(i.e., buyer and seller), which limits the amount of information
regarding the potential interaction between self and other status
across roles. Similarly, our previous research measuring the
effects of social status on acceptance of low and high offers in the
ultimatum game (UG) found that participants in low status were
more likely to accept low offers than participants in high status
(Hu et al., 2014, 2016). However, given that participants did not
know their partner’s status, it is unclear how self and other status
may interact to affect responses to low and high offers.
One overarching question in the above-mentioned studies is
that they did not manipulate the participants’ and the party’s
status simultaneously, making it unclear whether individuals in
low status were more willing to accept less of the pie in general
or if their acceptance took into account the social status of
other parties involved in the resource distribution. The lack of
a systematic understanding of the interaction between self- and
other-status on feelings toward resource distribution is critical
not only because one’s own and others’ social status rarely exist
independently in the real world, but also because people can
accurately encode one’s own and others’ social status within
minutes of meeting each other (Anderson and Kilduff, 2009), and
adjust their behavior accordingly.
One of the most widely used research tools for measuring
individuals’ responses to resource distributions is UG (Güth
et al., 1982). In UG, a proposer is given a set amount of money
and asked to divide it with another player, the recipient. If the
recipient accepts the offer, then the two receive the allocated
amount; if the recipient rejects the offer, the two players receive
nothing. Traditional economic theory suggests that proposers
should offer the lowest acceptable amount, while the recipient
should accept any non-zero offer. However, this type of economic
mindset is rarely found in actual experimental settings, as
proposers tend to divide the money evenly, and the recipients’
acceptance rate of offers increases as a function of the offer
level. Behavior in UG reflects not only fairness preferences but
also strategic decision-making between two parties (Rabin, 1993).
Importantly, previous studies have shown that the relationship
between the two parties affects behavior in UG (Eckel and
Grossman, 2001; Yu et al., 2015) or similar games (Wu et al.,
2011).
Due to the lack of research on the interaction between
one’s own and others’ social status during resource distribution,
we turn to social class research to inform our hypotheses
regarding the effects of self- and other-status on responses to
resource distribution. On the one hand, a wide array of findings
demonstrate that one’s own social status affects social interaction.
In comparison with individuals with high social class, individuals
with low social class are more perceptive and sensitive to the
feelings and expressions of others (Kraus et al., 2010) and are
more attuned to socially relevant and/or potentially threatening
stimuli (Muscatell et al., 2012). Moreover, when compared with
individuals in high social class, individuals in low social class
are more compassionate and empathic to the needs of others
(Kraus et al., 2012) and have been found to engage in more
prosocial behavior such as generosity, charity, trustworthiness,
and helping behavior, and in less selfish or destructive behavior
such as breaking laws and social norms (Piff et al., 2010, 2012). On
the other hand, a second line of research suggests the importance
of other-status processing. For example, in situations that require
unspoken coordination between two individuals, individuals of
different social status coordinate more effectively than individuals
of similar social status (De Kwaadsteniet and van Dijk, 2010). In
addition, rhesus monkeys will give up sugary liquid reward to
view high status monkeys (Deaner and Khera, 2005), and humans
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remember better and focus more attention on high status faces
than low status faces (Ratcliff et al., 2011). The natural reward
for accurately distinguishing high status others arises from the
potential not only to obtain their protection but also to learn their
ways (Tomasello et al., 1993, 2012).
The division in the potential effects of one’s own social
status and others’ social status on decision-making allows for
two potential hypotheses to emerge: (1) Participants’ acceptance
of low UG offers increases as a function of proposer’s social
status, regardless of one’s own social status (i.e., Proposer’s
Status Hypothesis). In the current study, support for this
hypothesis would be manifested by participants showing
increased acceptance rates of low UG offers for high status
proposers than for low status proposers, regardless of the
participant’s own status. (2) Participants’ acceptance of low UG
offers is most affected by other’s status when own status is
low, which is supported by research showing that in situations
that require coordination between two individuals, low status
individuals tend to defer to high status others but do not do so
for same-status others and by research on social class showing
that individuals occupying a low social class are more sensitive
to social information about other people (i.e., Interactive Status
Hypothesis; De Kwaadsteniet and van Dijk, 2010; Kraus et al.,
2010, 2012). Support for this hypothesis would be manifested
by participants in low status showing a greater difference in
acceptance rates of low UG offers by low and high status
proposers than participants in high status.
To address these hypotheses, in the current study we asked
the participant to compete against seven other participants
(confederates) in an interactive rank-inducing task (i.e., math
competition) to dynamically manipulate both the participant’s
and the opponents’ social status. All participants were raised in
China, which places a very strong emphasis on the development
of math skills from a young age, implying that a math-related
ranking is especially relevant to one’s view of the self. In the
math competition task (Figure 1A), the participants were given
a maximum of 10 s for each question to indicate which math
expression had a greater value, and the one who exhibited
higher accuracy and lower response time attained a higher rank
(Figure 1B). Afterward, participants acted as recipients in UG
with proposers of varying social status (Figure 1C).
In addition, given that social status is a relative construct, it
is extremely common for one’s social status to change from one
situation to the next. In order to control for the potential effects
of changes in social status on responses to resource distribution,
participants’ self-status was a between-participant factor in
Experiment 1 and a within-participant factor in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
To determine the sample size, we used G*Power 3 software (Faul
et al., 2007), which showed that we needed a sample size of at
least 92 for this study to have adequate power (1 – β > 0.80)
to detect a medium-size effect (f = 0.20). One hundred and
two undergraduate and graduate students (59 females) from local
universities in Beijing participated in the study. Each participant
was informed that the basic payment was around 30 Chinese yuan
(about 5 USD) and additional monetary reward would fluctuate
with their performance in the experiment (based on the random
selection of 10 UG trial results). On average, participants received
around 50 Chinese yuan (about 8 USD). Informed consent was
obtained from each participant before the test. The experiment
was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki
and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of
Psychological and Cognitive Sciences, Peking University.
Design and Procedure
Experiment 1 had a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed design, with the first
factor referring to the participants’ own social status (self-status:
low vs. high) as a between-participant factor, the second factor
referring to the proposer’s social status (other-status: low vs. high)
as a within-participant factor, and the third factor referring to
UG offer level (low vs. high) as a within-participant factor. The
information of social status was given as a set of stars, where
three stars represented high status, two stars represented middle
status, and one star represented low status. UG offers equal to or
less than 3 out of 10 yuan were operationally defined as “low,”
while any offer greater than 3 yuan was defined as “high,” and
no indication of “high” or “low” offers was expressed to the
participant. Past research using a similar paradigm has shown
that participants’ self-reported minimum acceptable UG offers
range from 3.0 (SE = 0.06) to 3.4 (SE = 0.06) yuan (Hu et al.,
2016). As a result, we used 3 yuan as a cutoff for “low” and “high”
UG offers.
Upon arriving at the laboratory, the participant shortly met
a same-sex confederate and was told that the two of them were
going to play as recipients in the UG along with six same-sex
strangers who would play as proposers and who had ostensibly
arrived earlier and were getting prepared in another room. The
participant never actually met the six proposers face-to-face
and only saw pictures of their faces during the experiment.
The purpose of such a setting was twofold: to increase the
interactivity and credibility of the whole experiment, and to avoid
a reputation-building effect in UG.
The experiment consisted of two tasks. The first was a rank-
inducing task, which was referred to as the “rank-inducing
session” (Zink et al., 2008; Boksem et al., 2012). This session
had 12 time-constrained math questions (10 s/question), half of
which were easy to solve, and half of which were difficult to
solve (Figure 1A). The reason for using both easy and difficult
arithmetic expressions was to be able to believably manipulate
participant ranking by assuring the participant’s achievement of
correct and incorrect responses. The participant’s task was to
compare two arithmetic expressions and select which was greater
in value by pressing the corresponding response key. There
were two types of expressions, complex fraction addition (e.g.,
4 78 + 5 59 ) and two-digit multiplication (e.g., 34 × 46). Ranking
was based on question accuracy and response time, with an
emphasis on accuracy to avoid participants guessing quickly to
increase time scores. The participant received his or her rank after
completing the rank-inducing task (Figure 1B). To avoid any
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic diagram of the experiment. Each experiment consisted of two sessions: the rank-inducing session and the UG session. In the
rank-inducing session, the participants completed several time-constrained math questions together with seven other players by selecting which of the 2 arithmetic
expressions was greater in value as quickly as possible (A). After the rank-inducing session, participants then viewed status information based on his/her
performance relative to others (B). The participant’s photo was highlighted with a yellow background. In the UG session (C), the participant was shown his/her own
photo and social status information along with an anonymous silhouette and the social status information of the proposer before each UG offer was presented.
confounding effect of social comparison between the participant
and the other recipient (confederate), we only presented the
ranking information of the participant and that of the other six
participants who would act as proposers in the subsequent UG.
The second task was UG (Figure 1C). Each trial began with
the presentation of a fixation sign against a black background.
Then the sentence “The computer is selecting a partner for this
round” in Chinese was presented, suggesting to the participant
that one of the six proposers was randomly selected by the
computer in the current trial. Then the participant’s own portrait
and a faceless silhouette were presented on the left and right
side of the screen respectively. The positions of these two figures
were counterbalanced over trials. At the same time, the rank
information of the participant and that of the proposer which
was paired with the participant in the current trial (denoted by
a set of stars) were presented beneath the corresponding facial
portrait/silhouette. Subsequently, the sentence “The proposer is
submitting the offer” in Chinese was presented on the lower
part of the screen indicating to the participant that the paired
proposer was distributing the 10 yuan between them. Then, the
proposer’s division scheme, with the amount for each player
beneath the corresponding portrait/silhouette, was revealed.
After receiving the offer, two options, “accept” and “reject,”
appeared on the left and right side of the screen respectively, with
their positions randomly exchanged over trials. The participant
was asked to make the “accept” or “reject” decision by pressing
the corresponding key on the keyboard. The participant was
reminded that the proposers made their decisions individually
and independently and that his/her decisions would not be
revealed to them during the experiment.
The experiment was administered using Presentation software
(Neurobehavioral System, Inc.) to control the arrangement and
timing of stimuli. For each level of status, the amount for the
participant in the low offer condition was drawn randomly from a
Gaussian distribution with a mean of 2 and standard deviation of
0.5; the amount for the participant in the high offer condition was
drawn randomly from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 4
and standard deviation of 0.5. Low UG offers to the participant
were less than or equal to 3 out of 10 yuan and ranged from
0.5/9.5 to 3/7; high UG offers to the participant were greater
than 3 out of 10 yuan and ranged from 3.5/6.5 to 5.5/4.5. The
number before the slash denoted the amount offered to the
participant and the number after the slash denoted the amount
allotted to the proposer. Unknown to the participant, all UG
offers were predetermined by a computer program and pseudo-
randomized with the restriction that no more than 3 consecutive
trials were of the same offer level. There were four critical (high
other-status/low UG offer, high other-status/high UG offer, low
other-status/low UG offer, and low other-status/high UG offer)
and two filler (middle other-status/low UG offer, and middle
other-status/high UG offer) conditions in total, and 12 trials for
every condition.
Before the formal test, participants performed 10 trials of the
math competition task and 10 trials of UG to become familiar
with the two tasks. To check the manipulation of social status,
after the experiment, the participant was asked to indicate on a
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seven-point Likert Scale to what extent he/she perceived his/her
status as higher (superior)/lower (inferior; 1=much lower/more
inferior, 7 = much higher/more superior) than the other players
in the game. In order to confirm the usage of 3 yuan as a cutoff for
the operational definition of “low” and “high” UG offers, after the
experiment, participants indicated their minimal acceptable UG
amount (out of 10 yuan). Finally, to measure participants’ fairness
expectations, participants were asked to indicate what amount of
UG offer (out of 10 yuan) would be considered a fair amount for
each proposer status level.
Given the importance of emotions on decisions to reject in
UG (Xiao and Houser, 2005; Harlé and Sanfey, 2007), after
the experiment participants were asked to report on a five-
point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very strongly) the extent
to which they felt negative and positive emotions both when
receiving their ranking information in the math competition task
and during UG. The negative emotions included the following
dimensions: irritable, uneasy, nervous, uncomfortable, angry,
and shameful; the positive emotions included the following
dimensions: interested, energetic, proud, inspired, determined,
excited, happy, satisfied, and superior. At the end of the
experiment, the participant was paid, debriefed, and thanked.
Results
Among the 102 participants, eight claimed that they disbelieved
the setup of the experiment. These participants were excluded
from data analysis, leaving 94 participants (low self-status group:
n= 47, 28 females, mean age 21.1 years, SD= 2.2; high self-status
group: n= 47, 26 females, mean age 21.0 years, SD= 2.4) for the
following analysis.
Manipulation Checks
The post-experiment questionnaire suggested that the number
of stars used to denote the participants’ rank in the math
competition task strongly influenced their perception of social
status. A one-way (star ranking: 3 vs. 1) ANOVA on the perceived
own status showed a significant main effect of star ranking,
F(1,92) = 7.31, p = 0.008. The participants perceived themselves
to be in higher status when they obtained three stars (high status)
in the math competition task (mean± SE, 4.45± 0.23, CI= [4.00,
4.90]) than those who obtained one star (3.51± 0.27, CI= [2.98,
4.04]).
The manipulation of other-status affected the participants’
self-reported minimal acceptable amount in UG (out of 10 yuan).
The minimum acceptable offer was significantly higher when the
offers were from low-status proposers (3.44 ± 0.12, CI = [3.19,
3.68]) than from high-status proposers (3.05 ± 0.11, CI = [2.84,
3.26]), F(1,92)= 12.80, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.12. There was neither a
significant main effect of self-status, p= 0.445, nor an interaction
between self-status and other-status, p = 0.288. Self-reported
minimal acceptable UG offer amount ranged from 3.05 to 3.44
out of 10 yuan, which is in line with previous research and in
support of using 3 yuan as a cutoff for “low” and “high” UG offers.
The fairness expectations of participants in the high self-status
group (5.18 ± 0.09, CI = [5.00, 5.36]) were higher than those
in the low self-status group (4.52 ± 0.09), CI = [4.34, 4.69],
F(1,92) = 28.59, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.24. And participants’ fairness
expectations were higher for low-status proposers (5.13 ± 0.09,
CI = [4.95, 5.31]) than for high-status proposers (4.57 ± 0.08,
CI = [4.41, 4.74]), F(1,92) = 21.80, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.19.
There was no significant interaction between self-status and
other-status on fairness expectations, p = 0.292. These results
suggest that the perceived fairness during resource distribution
was modulated by both self-status and other-status.
Finally, social status also affected participants’ experience of
emotions. We averaged scores on different dimensions to give
overall scores for the negative and positive emotions. When
receiving the ranking information, participants in the high self-
status group (3.24 ± 0.11, CI = [3.03, 3.45]) experienced more
positive emotions than the low self-status group (2.11 ± 0.10,
CI = [1.90, 2.32]), F(1,92) = 57.51, p < 0.001, and participants
in the low self-status group (1.90 ± 0.10, CI = [1.71, 2.10])
experienced more negative emotions than the high self-status
group (1.60 ± 0.08, CI = [1.43, 1.76]), F(1,92) = 5.67,
p = 0.019. These findings suggest that the math competition
and social status ranking were meaningful to the participants, as
participants who attained high status experienced more positive
emotions than participants who attained low status.
Additionally, during UG, there was a very marginal difference
in experienced positive emotions, p = 0.086, and no difference
in negative emotions, p = 0.696, between the high self-status
group and the low self-status group. This finding suggests that
any effects of social status on behavior in UG should be attributed
primarily to social status and not to the emotions associated with
the experience of high or low status per se.
Behavioral Results
We performed a 2 (other-status: high vs. low) × 2 (offer level:
low vs. high) repeated measures ANOVA with self-status (high vs.
low) as a between-participant factor on participants’ acceptance
rates for different offers in UG (Figure 2). This analysis revealed a
significant main effect of offer level, F(1,92) = 481.85, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.84, with the acceptance rate for low offers (0.35 ± 0.03,
CI = [0.29, 0.41]) being lower than for high offers (0.90 ± 0.02,
CI = [0.87, 0.93]). The main effect of other-status was also
significant, F(1,92) = 62.43, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.40, indicating
that the acceptance rate was higher for high status proposers
(0.68 ± 0.02, CI = [0.64, 0.72]) than for low status proposers
(0.57 ± 0.02, CI = [0.52, 0.61]). There was also a significant
interaction between other-status and offer level, F(1,92) = 23.61,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.20. Simple effects tests showed that acceptance
rates for low offers were higher when the offers were from high
status proposers (0.43 ± 0.03, CI = [0.37, 0.49]) than from low
status proposers (0.27 ± 0.03, CI = [0.20, 0.33], p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.44), and this effect was smaller for high offers (high
other-status: 0.93 ± 0.01, CI = [0.90, 0.96], low other-status:
0.86 ± 0.02, CI = [0.82, 0.91], p < 0.001, η2p = 0.15). The
main effect of self-status on acceptance rate was not significant,
p= 0.885.
The analysis revealed a significant interaction between self-
status and other-status, F(1,92) = 4.01, p = 0.048, η2p = 0.04.
Further tests revealed that participants in the low self-status
group more frequently accepted offers from high status proposers
(0.70 ± 0.03, CI = [0.65, 0.75]) than from low status proposers
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FIGURE 2 | The acceptance rate in Experiment 1 depicted as a function of self-status, other-status, and UG offer level. One star = low status; three
stars = high status. Error bars represent standard errors of the means.
(0.55 ± 0.03, CI = [0.49, 0.62], p < 0.001, η2p = 0.35), and
this effect was smaller for participants in the high self-status
group (high other-status: 0.66 ± 0.03, CI = [0.61, 0.72], low
other-status: 0.58± 0.03, CI= [0.51, 0.64], p< 0.001, η2p = 0.16).
Importantly, there was also a marginally significant three-
way interaction between self-status, other-status, and offer level,
F(1,92) = 3.22, p = 0.076, η2p = 0.03. Further tests showed
that for low offers, the two-way interaction between self-status
and other-status was significant, F(1,92) = 5.913, p = 0.020,
η2p = 0.06, such that participants in low status evidenced a more
robust difference in acceptance rates of low UG offers from
high status proposers (0.23 ± 0.04, CI = [0.14, 0.32]) and low
status proposers (0.45 ± 0.04, CI = [0.36, 0.53]), η2p = 0.39,
than when participants were in high status: low other-status:
0.30 ± 0.04, CI = [0.21, 0.39]; high other-status: 0.42 ± 0.04,
CI = [0.34, 0.51], η2p = 0.16. For high offers, there was no
significant interaction between self- and other-status, F(1,92)< 1,
p = 0.512. Figure 2 presents acceptance rates for different
offers.
Discussion
Overall, Experiment 1 showed that self-status and other-status
both influence responses to UG offers. Specifically, participants
were more likely to accept low offers from high status proposers,
and this effect was more robust for participants in the low self-
status group than in high self-status group, which provides partial
support for the Interactive Status Hypothesis. After attaining the
social status ranking, high status participants experienced more
positive emotions and less negative emotions than low status
participants, validating the meaningfulness of the competition
ranking. At the same time, low and high status participants
evidenced no difference in emotions during UG, confirming past
research showing that emotions cannot explain the effect of social
status on UG decision-making (Hu et al., 2014, 2016). In the next
experiment, to further confirm the Interactive Status Hypothesis
and see whether the effect of social status on responses to UG
offers exists when social status changes, we examined the effects
of self-status and other-status on UG acceptance decisions using
a within-subject design.
EXPERIMENT 2
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to see whether the effects
from Experiment 1 would remain across different contexts (i.e.,
when status changes). The general procedure was identical to
Experiment 1, except that the same participants completed
several rank-inducing sessions in which their social status was
changed according to their performance in the sessions.
Method
Participants
Once again, to determine the sample size, we used G∗Power
3 software (Faul et al., 2007), which showed that we needed a
sample size of at least 24 for this study to have adequate power
(1 – β > 0.80) to detect a medium-size effect (f = 0.30). Thirty
undergraduate and graduate students from a local university
in China participated in the study. Identical to Experiment
1, each participant was informed that the basic payment was
around 30 Chinese yuan (about 5 USD) and additional monetary
reward would fluctuate with their performance in the experiment
(based on the random selection of 10 UG trial results). On
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average, participants received around 50 Chinese yuan (about
8 USD). Informed consent was obtained from each participant
before the test. The experiment was conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the
Ethics Committee of the School of Psychological and Cognitive
Sciences, Peking University.
Design and Procedure
Experiment 2 had a 3× 3× 2 within-participant factorial design,
with the first factor referring to the participant’s own social status
(self-status: low vs. middle vs. high), the second factor referring to
the proposer’s social status (other-status: low vs. middle vs. high),
and the third factor referring to UG offer level (low vs. high). The
star system and operational definition of low and high offer levels
were the same as in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2, the participant first competed in six rounds
of the rank-inducing task (i.e., math competition). Then he or
she was given a rank (high, middle, or low) according to his
or her performance on the task. Following the ranking, the
participant played UG with one proposer randomly drawn from
the opponents. Different from Experiment 1, the participant was
informed that after every several rounds of UG (36 rounds/
block), there would be a new block of the rank-inducing task.
In other words, UG was interleaved between blocks of the rank-
inducing task. Participants were also informed that the rank
attained after each block of the rank-inducing task would pertain
only to that particular block of the rank-inducing task and the
ensuing block of UG. Each round of the rank-inducing task
was composed of three easy and three difficult problems, which
facilitated the manipulation of participant rank across rounds.
The participants were also informed that the rank-inducing task
had no direct relationship with UG. Partners in the rank-inducing
task and UG were the same throughout the experiment.
In total, there were six blocks of the math competition,
with six time-constrained math questions per block (36 in
total, 10 s/question). The order of the ranks attained were
counterbalanced across participants.
The second task was UG, which was identical to Experiment
1 (see Experiment 1 Method). There were six blocks of UG. We
manipulated participant status (i.e., self-status: high vs. middle vs.
low), proposer status (i.e., other-status: high vs. middle vs. low),
and offer level (high vs. low), resulting in 18 critical conditions.
Each condition included 12 trials.
Before the formal test, participants performed six trials of the
math competition and 10 trials of UG to get familiar with the
two tasks. To check the manipulation of social status, after the
experiment, the participant was asked to indicate on a seven-
point Likert Scale to what extent he/she perceived his/her status
as higher (superior)/lower (inferior; 1 = much lower, 7 = much
higher) than other players in the game when he/she was in each
status condition. The participants were then debriefed, paid, and
thanked for their participation.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Among the thirty participants, one participant did not believe
the experimental setup and was removed from further analysis,
leaving 29 participants (20 females; mean age 20.7 years,
SD= 1.4) for the following analysis.
The same manipulation check in Experiment 1 was used
here. This post-experiment check indicated that the number of
stars which was used to denote the participants’ rank in the
math task strongly influenced their perception of social status.
A one-way (star ranking: three vs. two vs. one) repeated-measures
ANOVA on perceived status showed a significant main effect of
star ranking, F(2,56) = 96.06, p < 0.001. Pairwise comparison
on responses to the seven-point Likert Scale revealed that the
participants perceived themselves to be in higher status when
they obtained three stars in the math competition (mean ± SE,
5.28± 0.16, CI= [4.94, 5.61]) than when they obtained two stars
(4.00± 0.09, CI= [3.82, 4.18]) and one star (2.41± 0.16, CI [2.08,
2.74]), ps < 0.001. Also, the participants perceived themselves to
be higher in status when they obtained two stars than when they
obtained one star, p < 0.001.
Behavioral Results
We performed a 3 (self-status: high vs. middle vs. low) × 3
(other-status: high vs. middle vs. low) × 2 (offer level: high vs.
low) repeated measures ANOVA on participants’ acceptance rates
for different offers in UG (Figure 3). This analysis revealed a
significant main effect of offer level, F(2,56) = 129.60, p < 0.001,
η2p= 0.82, with a lower acceptance rate for low offers (0.31± 0.06,
CI = [0.19, 0.44]) than for high offers (0.92 ± 0.02, CI = [0.50,
0.71], p < 0.001). The main effect of self-status was also
significant, F(2,56) = 14.21, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34, indicating
that the acceptance rate was higher when the participants were
in low status (0.66 ± 0.03, CI = [0.59, 0.72]) than when they
were in middle (0.59 ± 0.04, CI = [0.51, 0.67], p < 0.001)
or high status (0.60 ± 0.04, CI = [0.51, 0.68], p = 0.001).
There was no difference between the acceptance rates when
participants were in middle and high status (p = 0.740). The
main effect of the proposer social status was also significant,
F(2,56) = 11.45, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.29, indicating that the
acceptance rate was higher when the proposers were in high
status (0.63± 0.04, CI= [0.55, 0.70]) than when they were in low
status (0.59± 0.04, CI= [0.51, 0.67], p= 0.001). The acceptance
rate was also higher for proposers in middle status (0.62 ± 0.04,
CI = [0.55, 0.70] than for proposers in low status (0.59 ± 0.04,
CI = [0.51, 0.67], p < 0.001). There was no difference between
the acceptance rates when the proposers were in middle and high
status, p= 0.605.
Similar to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 showed a significant
interaction between other-status and offer level, F(2,56) = 5.09,
p = 0.009, η2p = 0.15. Further tests revealed that the acceptance
rate for the low offers was lower when the proposers were
in low status (0.28 ± 0.06, CI = [0.15, 0.41]) than when
they were in middle status (0.32 ± 0.06, CI = [0.19, 0.45],
p = 0.014) and high status (0.34 ± 0.06, CI = [0.22, 0.47],
p = 0.001), and there was no difference between the acceptance
rates for the low offers when proposers were in middle and
high status, p = 0.332. For high offers, the acceptance rate
of offers from low-status proposers (0.91 ± 0.02, CI = [0.86,
0.96]) was marginally lower than from middle-status proposers
(0.93 ± 0.02, CI = [0.90, 0.97], p = 0.051), but was not different
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FIGURE 3 | The acceptance rate in Experiment 2 depicted as a function of self-status, other-status, and UG offer level. One star = low status; two
stars = middle status; three stars = high status. Error bars represent standard errors of the means.
from high-status proposers (0.92 ± 0.02, CI = [0.88, 0.96],
p = 0.783), and there was no difference in the acceptance
rates of high offers from middle- and high-status proposers,
p= 0.629.
We were most interested in the interaction between self-
status, other-status, and offer level. The analysis revealed a three-
way interaction, F(4,112) = 9.66, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.26. To
further analyze this three-way interaction, three separate two-
way repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted on participant
acceptance rates when in low, middle, and high self-status. When
participants were endowed with a low self-status, the main effects
of offer level [F(1,28) = 115.01, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.80] and other-
status [F(2,56)= 15.31, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.35] were significant, in
addition to the interaction between offer level and other-status,
F(2,56)= 15.36, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.35. Simple effects tests showed
that low status participants were less likely to accept low offers
when they were offered by a low-status proposer (0.25 ± 0.07,
CI = [0.12, 0.39]) than a middle- (0.37 ± 0.07, CI = [0.23,
0.51]) or high-status proposer (0.44 ± 0.05, CI = [0.33, 0.55]),
ps < 0.001; participants in low status were slightly less likely
to accept low offers from middle-status proposers (0.37 ± 0.07,
CI = [0.23, 0.51]) than from high-status proposers (0.44 ± 0.05,
CI = [0.33, 0.55]), p = 0.090. There was no difference between
acceptance rates of high offers (ps = 1.00). When participants
were endowed with a middle self-status, there was a main effect
of offer level [F(1,28) = 134.73, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.83], yet
there was no main effect of other-status, p = 0.525, and the
interaction between other-status and offer level was significant
but had a smaller effect size than that of the low self-status
condition F(2,56) = 3.50, p = 0.037, η2p = 0.11. In addition, tests
for simple effects showed no difference in acceptance rates for low
or high offers given by low-, middle-, or high-status proposers,
ps > 0.236. When endowed with a high self-status, the two main
effects of offer level [F(1,28) = 115.06, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.80]
and other-status [F(2,56) = 3.56, p = 0.035, η2p = 0.11] were
significant, but the interaction was not, p = 0.275. Taken as a
whole, the three-way interaction suggests that the effects of status
and response decisions in UG were greatest when the participant
was in a low-status position.
Discussion
Overall, findings from Experiment 2 replicate the findings from
Experiment 1 in a changing social hierarchy. These findings
confirm that both self-status and other-status influence the
responses to resource distribution. In addition, Experiment 2
provides strong support for the Interactive Status Hypothesis
by showing that, in comparison with high and middle self-
status, participants in low social status were more affected by
the social status of others when deciding whether to accept
or reject UG offers. In particular, when participants occupied
low status, acceptance rates of low UG offers increased as a
function of proposer social status, an effect not present when
the same participants occupied middle or high status, which
provides direct support for the Interactive Status Hypothesis, and
which suggests that occupying a low status may elicit strategic,
other-oriented behavior.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study showed that the lower the status of the
recipient, the more likely he/she was to accept low offers;
additionally, the higher the status of the proposer giving a
low offer, the more likely that offer was to be accepted. These
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two main effects suggest that both self- and other-status affect
responses to resource distribution and confirm past studies
suggesting that social status affects the acceptance of monetary
allocations (Ball et al., 2001; Albrecht et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2014,
2016). Experiment 1 showed that participants were more likely
to accept low offers from high status proposers, and this effect
was more robust for participants in the low self-status group than
in high self-status group. Experiment 2 largely replicated these
findings in a changing hierarchy by showing that only in low
status were participants more likely to accept low offers given by
high status others. In addition, while in low status, participants’
acceptance rates of low offers increased as a function of other-
status (Figure 3). These findings provide strong support for the
Interactive Status Hypothesis.
Here, we propose two potential mechanisms underlying the
interaction between self- and other-status on acceptance of
low offers during resource distribution: one cognitive and one
emotional. We found that participants were more affected by
other-status while in low status than in high status, which
supports past research on the unique cognitive and emotional
effects of being endowed with low social status (De Kwaadsteniet
and van Dijk, 2010; Kraus et al., 2011). On the one hand, from
the social cognitive perspective of social class, while individuals
from a low social class typically exhibit a contextual and
externally oriented cognitive pattern, individuals from a high
social class exhibit a solipsistic and individualistic cognitive
pattern (Kraus et al., 2012). In light of this line of reasoning, low-
status individuals should increase attention to others’ identities,
thoughts, and actions (i.e., proposer social-status), and adjust
their decisions accordingly (i.e., whether to reject low UG offers);
high-status individuals should focus more on their own goals and
interests (i.e., the inequality level of the offer) than others’ identity
(i.e., proposers’ social-status).
On the other hand, from an emotional perspective, past
research using a similar paradigm has found that participants
viewing their own low rank status exhibit an increased P2
amplitude in electrophysiology, in comparison with when they
view their own high status rank (Hu et al., 2014), which is thought
to represent increased attention to unpleasant stimuli, especially
those with a negative emotional valence (i.e., negativity bias;
Carretié et al., 2001, 2004; Delplanque et al., 2004; Olofsson and
Polich, 2007). Using this line of reasoning, one could infer that
increased negative emotions may lead to an increased likelihood
of accepting low offers during resource distribution. This would
be in contrast with existing findings on the effects of negative
emotions during UG, which have shown that priming negative
emotions leads to an increase in rejection rates of UG offers
(Harlé and Sanfey, 2007). However, these differences may be
due to differences in the experimental design, as Harlé and
Sanfey (2007) primed feelings of sadness using short movie clips,
whereas our past (Hu et al., 2014) and current studies elicited
interpersonal emotions. Given certain constraints of the current
and past studies (i.e., UG emotions were measured oﬄine), future
research aimed at better understanding the potential explanatory
role of these two accounts in explaining acceptance behavior
would greatly benefit our understanding of the effect of social
status on responses to resource distribution.
Social status is a relative construct that elicits changes in
mindset from one context to the next. A professor may enjoy
high status with his/her doctoral students and experience low
status when meeting with the dean. Findings from Experiment 2,
in which social status changes occurred within minutes of
each other, suggest that individuals can enter new social status
mindsets very quickly. Not only are adaptations to social status
mindsets rapid, but these adaptations have meaningful influences
on decision-making behavior with real economic consequences.
One interesting question for future research is whether people
experience social status differently depending on the status
of their partners. For example, a low status participant could
experience his/her low status differently when playing UG with
a low status proposer than a high status proposer. Also, given the
rapid adaptation to status-related mindset changes evidenced in
Experiment 2 when participants were in a more passive role (i.e.,
responding to the offer of the proposer), one other interesting
question for future research would be whether previous findings
regarding the effects of social status are adaptive across contexts
when the individual is in an active role, such as choosing between
ethical and unethical behavior (e.g., Piff et al., 2012).
There are three additional points worth mentioning. First, a
classic study by Knoch et al. (2006) shows that, under certain
conditions, recipients in UG are able to consciously perceive
an offer as unfair and still accept it. An interesting question
would be whether or not participants in low status accepted
low offers despite judging them as unfair. In the current
study, post-experiment questions probing participants’ fairness
judgments of varying UG offers showed no clear influence of
social status on judgments of fairness, which suggests that the
effects of perceived fairness may need to be tested online or
implicitly (e.g., via skin conductance response). In Experiment
1, high and low status participants reported no difference in
emotions during UG, which could suggest that feelings of
fairness may have been affected by social status. As these
findings would have interesting societal ramifications, future
studies should analyze online feelings of both emotions and
fairness to see what is underlying the increased likelihood of
accepting low offers while in low status. These findings may
also have interesting implications for the debate over whether
disadvantaged individuals are more likely to accept unfair
realities. For instance, System Justification Theory proposes that
low status people are more likely to support the system as
it is (i.e., status quo), despite inequality (i.e., status-legitimacy
effect; Jost et al., 2004); however, recent work questions the
robustness of the status-legitimacy effect (Brandt, 2013). If
the feelings of social status from our study are similar to
feelings of low social class, our findings provide indirect
support for the status-legitimacy effect, as the behavior of
participants in low status (i.e., acceptance rates of low UG
offers increased as a function of proposer social status) would
act to maintain/perpetuate the order of social status within the
hierarchy.
Another interesting question for future studies is whether the
findings from Experiment 2 would be present during hierarchy
instability within one’s group. One important component in
social hierarchies is their stability. In unstable hierarchies,
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interactions with other group members are more salient socially
and behaviorally than in stable hierarchies (Zink et al., 2008),
as high status members are striving to maintain their status,
whereas low status members want to increase their status, leading
to potential struggles for social status. Moreover, in stable social
hierarchies, the greatest amount of stress is experienced by low
status individuals, whereas in unstable hierarchies, high status
members experience the greatest amount of stress in order to
retain their position and settle conflict (Sapolsky, 2004, 2005).
Given the importance of hierarchy stability and that Experiment
2 confirmed the Interactive Status Hypothesis in individuals
whose social status changed across contexts, future studies would
benefit from analyzing the robustness of these effects in stable and
unstable hierarchies.
Finally, given that social status and power are similar yet
distinct constructs (Magee and Galinsky, 2008), future studies
should also consider whether the social status effects found in the
current study have any influence on or could be explained by a
perceived sense of power. In the current study, the endowment
of social status led to no direct influence or control over the
amount of money another individual received, hence the effects
we obtained are best interpreted as social status and not as power.
CONCLUSION
The current study showed that social status is a critical
factor in responses to resource distribution. During economic
interactions, low status individuals are more sensitive to the
status of others. In particular, when occupying low status,
acceptance of low UG offers increases as a function of others’
social status, whereas high status individuals’ behavior is far less
affected by others’ social status. The findings from the current
study could have important implications for understanding
the behavior and mindset of individuals in a social hierarchy,
showing that low status individuals’ acceptance of low offers
may be strategic and related to the status of the other individual
in question, and that high status individuals’ behavior may be
less attuned to contextual information during decision making
in social interactions. Moreover, in general, support for the
Interactive Status account also has interesting implications not
only for social psychology (i.e., relative social status influences
behavior), but also for behavioral economics (i.e., acceptance of
low offers are context-dependent), and evolutionary psychology
(i.e., reasons behind acceptance of low offers in a social
hierarchy). Our results may also help us to understand responses
to resource distribution in status-related interactions in the
workplace.
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